Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to make transparent what Medco does not. Transparency in a company's business model is good for economic welfare (i.e., competition) but not necessarily good for a company's stock performance. This paper is written from the perspective of economic welfare, not from the perspective of investing. In the six years we have been writing about the Big 3 PBM lack of transparency, conflict of interest, "sins of omission", and tacit collusion to hold up generic prices in the drug supply chain, the group's stock performance has far exceeded that of any other group involved in healthcare cost containment. What disturbs us about the Big 3 PBM business model is precisely what Wall Street loves.
With a few exceptions, all of the data used in our update comes from 10-K and 10-Q financials statements that Medco has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Some of the revelations are derived from simple arithmetic -e.g., calculation of trends in per script brand rebates.
Most of the revelations are based on algebraic derivations where reasonable assumptions are inserted for unknowns -e.g., the derivation of the mail order pharmacy margin based on a reasonable assumption for the retail spread margin. 
Transactional Gross Profits versus Client Fees
In the first phase of our update, we pay special attention to quantifying the importance of gross profits from pharmacy operations relative to management fees paid by clients. In the past, we measured relative importance as a percentage of Medco's overall gross profits. Here we develop measures of importance in terms of average dollar per-member-per-year (PMPY). This facilitates quantitative comparisons with management fees typically charged for other healthcare cost containment services like medicine therapy management. 4 Fortunately, Medco has always separated out transactional margins from management fees. For the first time in its FY2007's 10-K annual report, Medco separated out client fees from so-called "data fees" received from Pharma. 5 This separation was likely due to pressure for more transparency as many believe that "data fees" from Pharma are a surrogate for pharmaceutical rebates. As the disaggregation below indicates, "data fees" contributed only 5.2% of Medco's FY2007 gross profits, small compared to the contributions by transactional margins, but substantial compared to the 7.9%
contribution by the sum of all management fees paid by clients. 
Fees From Pharma
Total disclosed in 10-K
Fees from Clients
Total disclosed in 10-K Table 2 below presents our estimate of the distribution of Medco's revenue between mail order and retail channels. This is necessary for our full disaggregation presented in Table 3 . Based on the aggregated data in Table 1 and the assumptions above, we can derive an estimate of Medco's transactional gross profits by source below in Table 3 . Key findings are as follows:
In 3Q2004, we estimated that mail order margins contributed 11.8% to Medco's overall gross profits with virtually no specialty pharmacy contribution. In 2007, we estimate that mail order now contributes 49.9% to overall gross profits, with an added 14.2% contribution from specialty pharmacy.
Excluding specialty pharmacy, Medco's captive mail order pharmacy contributes 59.0% of total gross profits.
In 3Q2004, Medco first disclosed that its rebate retention rate was 40.5% of gross rebates. By 2007,
Medco has reduced its rebate retention rate to 15.4%.
In 3Q2004, we calculated with certainty that retained rebates contributed 71.4% of total gross profits.
By 2007, the contribution of retained rebates has fallen to only 18.6% of gross profits.
For FY2007 we estimate that Medco's gross profit margin for mail order to be to be 9.0%. This is considerably higher than our 2Q2005 estimate of 4.5% for Medco's mail order operations which was also net of co-payments.
It is important to make clear that reported mail order margins cannot be compared to reported retail fill margins, which typically runs around 22%. Mail order and specialty pharmacies are considered "manufacturing" operations by accountants and their cost of sale includes ingredients as well as pharmacy labor, facilities and other indirect "manufacturing" costs. This differs from how accountants define the costs of sales of retail pharmacies, which includes only ingredients purchased for resale and inventory warehousing costs, but not retail pharmacy labor or facilities costs. Our work indicates that the so-called retail reimbursement "spread" -the difference between client-toMedco reimbursements and Medco-to-retailer reimbursements for prescriptions dispensed at retailonly contributes 4.2% of Medco's overall gross profits. While PBMs add no value in the retail channel via fulfillment, they do provide clients with other values-reimbursement negotiation, working capital management, and a small risk of loss. While we would prefer that these value added services were captured with transparent management fees rather than opaque spread margins, nevertheless a relatively small return to PBMs for managing retail pharmacy reimbursements is justified.
Our past disaggregation work basically came down to one equation and two unknowns -mail order fill margin and retail spread margin. Total margin, running around 6 percentage points, was known, as was margins on co-payments (none), rebates, and fees. We plugged in various retail spread margins to see what the resulting mail order fill margin would be. In our disaggregation work then and now, we have fixed the spread at .5% of retail reimbursements. 8 Robert Garis began reporting in 2003 instances of double and triple digit spreads and made a big deal of PBM deception in this area. 9 Even today, The Wall Street Journal's new reporter covering the PBM industry has made a big deal of retail spreads based only on anecdotal evidence. 10 The fact of the matter is that Medco's aggregate gross profits of six or so percent is a given in a financial model. So are gross and retained rebates. What remains is a one equation model with two unknowns. We have found that whenever we plug in an aggregate spread over 2% in our financial model, it drives the mail order margin to unreasonable levels. Our conclusion is that anecdotal spreads of double and triple digits have validity, but little "weight", as in weighted average gross profit margins.
A "Stylized" Model of Mail Order Pharmacy Gross Profits by Drug Type
The purpose of this section is to present a "stylized" financial model of a large mail order pharmacy operation in order to derive estimates of unit margins for various brand and generic drug types. The model becomes "stylized" if we tie out the aggregates to our per 90 count script estimates for Medco's mail order revenue, gross profits, and margin, which were $172.11, $156.60, and $15.51, respectively.
There are several reasons for this exercise. First, we want to quantify the relative importance of mail order generics to the Big 3 PBM business model. Second, we want to refine the pharmacy financial model to include a new drug type: a generic with single-source protection given by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) during the first year after patent expiration. This so-called "new" generic has an average wholesale price (AWP) of a brand, due to its single-source protection, but a contracted reimbursement percentage of an "old" multiple-source generic. Simvastatin in its first year after losing its patent protection is an example of a "new" generic. The purpose here is to show how a "new" generic of a previous blockbuster brand can have such an inflated unit margin that it can create a "bubble" in aggregate pharmacy gross profits even though it might represent less that 3% of total scripts dispensed.
Ultimately, we want to produce a matrix of unit margins and a matrix of aggregate gross profits by source by drug type by channel. To achieve this, we need estimates of mail order margins derived from our stylized model coupled with Medco data-derived estimates of dollar spread margins and average retained rebates per brand script. This becomes the basis for our analysis of Medco's claim that their business model is aligned with clients' interest.
The table summarizes a financial model of a large mail order pharmacy operation. The details are presented in Table 4 . We find it extremely useful to postulate three types of drugs dispensed, each with a distinct margin, as measured both by dollar per script and by percentage: (1) a single-source generic with a high AWP (e.g. simvastatin); (2) a multiple-source generic with a low AWP (e.g. lovastatin); and (3) a brand with a high AWP (e.g. Lipitor).
The table above and below highlight two aspects of the financials of a large mail order pharmacy operation. One is that the ingredient and prescription margins are higher for generics than brands by design. The second is that new generics have higher dollar margins than older generics even though they have similar ingredient and prescription percentage margins. This is due to a flaw in the AWP reimbursement formula that compensates for ridiculously low dispensing fees with percentages, rather than fixed dollars, off AWP. This highlights our contention that the flaw in the AWP formula is not so much the basis -AWP -but the evolution over time of the use of percentages to cover below cost dispensing fees.
A better alternative would be a fixed dollar "fill and fair return fee". A fair dispensing fee would be around $9.00 which would reward Medco for being a low cost dispenser at $7.80 per mail order script. Currently, the gross profits, or return, on Medco's mail order operations covers 49.9% of remaining "SG&A" costs and operating income, while client fees covers only 5.2%, an obvious intentional cross-subsidy due to the desire to obfuscate its business model. A fair return fee around Medco's mail order's share of gross profits would be reduced from 49.9% to 12.9% while client fees, the transparent share of its business model if you will, would go from 5.2% to 42.2%.
The table also highlights how the loss of patent by a blockbuster brand drug like Zocor can create a material "bubble" in pharmacy gross profits as an old brand becomes a new generic, and then within a year becomes an old generic. Even though a blockbuster generic like simvastatin in its first year contributes less than 3% of prescription volume, it can contribute over 10% of a pharmacy's gross profit.
This "simvastatin bubble" passed through the financials of the Big 3 PBMs and the large drugstore 
Transactional Gross Profits by Source by Drug Type by Channel
In Table 3 Next we derive a simple average spread margin by dividing our estimated total spread margin of $123
Million by the 465 Million figure for total number of retail scripts dispensed by Medco's retail network in FY07. The average comes to $ .26 per script. We assume simply that the average spread margin is the same for generics as for brands.
We also derive a simple average of retained rebates per script by dividing Medco's reported aggregate retained rebates of $548 Million by figure for adjusted brand scripts across all channels of 320 Million. The 30 count script average equals $1.71.
The final data required for this disaggregation are estimates of mail order fill margins by drug type.
We use unit margins derived from our stylized financial model presented in Table 4 . Now we are ready to cross multiply Medco's prescription numbers with unit margins by source by drug type by channel summarized in Table 6 below:
The full blown disaggregation is presented in Table 7 . The key result is that we estimate that Medco now derives 54.8% of its transactional gross profits from generics. Furthermore, its captive mail order operation generates 79.7% of transactional gross profits while the retail channel contributes 20.3%. Table 8 below. Based on these new results, we would reverse our assessment and say that Medco's business model now is aligned with clients. What is driving the upward trend in generics' share of gross profits? While unit margins on mail order generics has improved, so too has unit margins on brands in the form of retained rebates as detailed later in this paper. So, it is not clear to us that there has been a shift in relative unit margins toward mail order generics.
We present in Table 9 a comparison of the share of script volume by drug type and channel. The two sets of data are our 2007 update presented in Table 5 and the 2002-3 FTC data. It suggests that the rising trend in generics' share of gross profits in the PBM business model is being driven by the generic utilization rate and not any significant shift to mail order. We can confirm this by looking at Medco's trends in generic dispensing rate and the so-called "mail order penetration rate" -the share of total adjusted (30 day count) scripts filled by the mail order channel. The graph below confirms that Medco's overall generic dispensing rate has increased dramatically from 46.3% to 63.8%. We tend to believe that much of this is due to a multi-year bubble in patent expirations of blockbuster drugs, which is beyond Medco's control, rather than the result of discretionary choices made by Medco to promote therapeutically equivalent generics. This relative growth in generic volume can be "supercharged" when it is coupled with a simultaneous shift in the mail order penetration rate. However, the second graph below indicates that this was not the case.
Medco has always touted its captive mail order operation as a cost-effective alternative to retail fulfillment. While Medco has a higher mail order penetration rate that its two rivals, Express Scripts and CVS Caremark, nevertheless Medco has failed to achieve any consistent upward trend in mail 
Margins on "Rebatable" Brands
Based on aggregate gross profits by drug type, Medco's business model is now aligned with clients.
However, as we have stated previously, there are problems using either aggregate gross profits or average unit margins to evaluate alignment claims.
First, it is a basic principle of economics that decisions are made "at the margin". Medco has discretion in plan design and compliance and makes these choices at a microeconomic level on the basis of unit margins not aggregate gross profits. Second, there is a great deal of variability in per script rebates. 13 Unit margins for brands based on averages fails to measure the true profitability of highly "rebatable" brands like Lipitor and Nexium.
We have presented in more detail elsewhere a theory of why brand rebates are variable. 14 Bargaining theory suggests that rebates are paid only in oligopolistic markets. Not only is there variability of rebates received at any one time, but the competitive environment in any therapeutic class changes over time as drugs gain and lose patent protection. In other words, the rebatability of a therapeutic class rises and falls as it transitions from being monopolistic to oligopolistic to competitive.
We should add that the rebatability of a therapeutic class does not really begin when a single brand drug faces competition from new, "me-too" brand drugs. As have said, it does not appear that rebates serve as "barriers to enantiomeric entry". If they did, then you would tend to find only a single brand in the coveted Tier 2 of Big 3 PBM national formularies, which is not the case.
Rebates are payments to Big 3 PBM for committing "sins of omission" -abstaining from favoring a generic that is therapeutically equivalent to a brand. The Big 3 PBMs would have you believe that they receive market share rebates for favoring one brand over another. But, the 2005 FTC study found that contracts between Pharma and the Big 3 PBMs defined the "market" in market share rebates to include therapeutically equivalent generics.
For example, it is our view that the rebatability of the statin class did not begin with the introduction of In Table 12 , we revisit our estimates of average unit margins from all sources -spread, fill, and retained rebates --to see whether a mail order generic still has a higher total unit margin than a rebatable brand drug. We compare our 2007 data with our recasting of 2002-3 data presented in the FTC study.
If evaluations of the alignment claim were based on broad margin averages as presented in Table 6 , then mail order generics would be the most profitable choice "at the margin" for Medco.
However, the real choice is between rebatable brands like Lipitor and Nexium and therapeutically equivalent old generics like simvastatin and omeprazole, respectively. Table 12 shows that the total margin -transaction plus retained rebate -on a rebatable mail order brand is $8.36. This is higher than the $7.67 margin for an old mail order generic, but still far less than the outrageous $20.47 margin for a new single-source generic like simvastatin during its first year after loss of patent protection.
Medco's business model still isn't aligned with interests of clients when it comes to promoting the substitution of therapeutically equivalent generics for high priced, but highly rebatable, brands Lipitor or Nexium. 
Medco Trend in Average Rebates Received Per Brand Script
The purpose of this section is to make transparent what Medco does not -a rising trend in per script brand rebates. While Medco is the only Big 3 PBM to disclose fully gross rebates received and total adjusted brand scripts, it fails to carry out the next step by dividing the two to yield a figure for average rebates received per script. Earlier, we cited statistics from an FTC study of the Big 3 PBMs in 2002-3 that found that 71% of total rebate dollars came from a small portion of brand drugs. We presented a theory suggesting that these highly rebatable drugs were blockbuster brand drugs facing competition from cheap, therapeutically equivalent, multi-sourced generics.
It follows from this theory of rebates that trends in gross rebates received follow the ebb and flow of generic, but not me-too brand, competition facing blockbuster brand drugs. For example, we believe that the rebates paid by Pfizer to protect Lipitor really kicked when Zocor lost patent protection, not when Crestor came on the market. Basically, the growth and decline in rebates paid on behalf of a blockbuster drug mirrors the transition of a therapeutic class from monopolistic (no rebates) to oligopolistic (high rebates) to competitive (low rebates). This modulation of the rebate curve over the life of a brand drug is increased when the drug is a blockbuster.
We believe that there are 3 therapeutic classes -statins, proton pump inhibitors, and non-barbiturate sleep-aids -that currently attract a substantial portion of gross rebates paid by Pharma. The list of highly rebatable brands in these 3 therapeutic classes include (1) the statins Lipitor and Crestor facing competition from simvastatin; (2) the proton pump inhibitors Nexium and Prevacid facing competition from omeprazole and OTC Prilosec; and (3 ) the sleep aids Ambien CR, Lunesta, and Rozerem facing competition from zolpidem.
